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FOREWORD
In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute
held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The
Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century."
Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New
Technologies and New Threats."
Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the
changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been
motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular
images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight
103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in
the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific
individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol,
knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a
highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific
political or ideological objectives.
Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and
tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from
religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or
ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of
people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious
group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more
difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their
disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer
bomb to biologically-altered viruses.
Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with
warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of
terrorism falls very much within their purview. For that reason, I
commend to you the following monograph.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL SPECTRUM
The "revolution in military affairs," it is argued, heralds a new
era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the
conventional battlefield. "Just as gunpowder, the mechanization of
battle, and atomic weapons previously changed the fundamental conduct
and nature of warfare, so will a combination of technological progress,
doctrinal sophistication, and innovative force employment in turn render
. . . existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete." The assumption
that U.S. armed forces alone will have the capability to harness all the
elements of this revolution is in large measure derived from the
demonstrated superiority of American combined arms over the much larger
Iraqi forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.1 The effect, according to
one analysis, will be profound:
In any conventional conflict in which the United States or
any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third
World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the
change is so significant that we have returned to the
military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars
pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western
troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed
only with shields and spears.2
Equally significant, however, is that the revolution in military
affairs remains largely confined to the conventional battlefield only.
Indeed, as many observers of this phenomenon themselves concede, the
revolution will have little, if any, impact on American military
capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla
warfare.3 Hence, while Operation DESERT STORM may be a model for the
revolution in military affairs occurring at the mid and high ends of the
conflict spectrum, the problems that U.S. forces encountered in Somalia,
for example, may be a more accurate and telling model for the types of
conflict at the low end of the spectrum that U.S. military forces are
more likely to find themselves involved. As our frustrating and
increasingly forgotten experiences in Vietnam more than a quarter of a
century ago demonstrate, this is by no means a new lesson. Indeed, in no
realm of conflict today is the asymmetry between American capability and
sophistication on the one hand and the crude, even primitive, ability of
an adversary to inflict pain on the other perhaps as salient or possibly
portentous as with terrorism.
Trends in Terrorist Tactics.
The contrast between the means and methods of modern warfare and
the tactics and techniques of contemporary terrorism is striking.
Whereas technological progress has produced successively more complex,
lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons systems that are
deployed from a variety of air, land, and sea platforms, terrorism has
functioned largely in a technological vacuum, aloof or averse to the
continual refinement and growing sophistication of modern warfare.
Terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century,
on the same two basic "weapons systems": the gun and the bomb.
Admittedly, the guns used by terrorists today have larger ammunition
capacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the
Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the
governor general of St. Petersburg.4 Similarly, bombs today require

smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and
more easily concealed than the sticks of TNT with which the Fenian
dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago.5
The implication of terrorist reliance on these two weapons,
however, goes far beyond mere tactical convenience. It also suggests an
a priori reluctance or aversion to killing en masse given the
comparatively discrete numbers of casualties that can be inflicted with
even self-loading, rapid fire automatic weapons or powerful plastic
explosives. Despite its popularity as a fictional theme, terrorists in
fact have rarely contemplated--much less actively attempted--the
infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties through the use of
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Indeed, of more than 8,000
incidents recorded in The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism
since 1968, only 52 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting such
attacks, attempting to use chemical or biological agents or to steal, or
otherwise fabricate on their own nuclear devices.6 Thus, terrorists seem
almost inherently content with the limited killing potential of their
handguns and machine guns and the slightly higher rates that their bombs
have at times achieved.
This self-imposed restraint is most clearly reflected in the
risk-averse tactical repertoire embraced by most terrorist groups.
Bombings, for example, account for nearly half (46 percent) of all
international terrorist attacks carried out since 1968: a proportion
that annually has rarely fallen below 40 percent or exceeded 50
percent.7 The reliance on bombing by terrorists is not surprising given
that bombs provide a dramatic, yet fairly easy and often risk-free means
of drawing attention to the terrorists and their causes. Few skills are
required to manufacture a crude bomb, surreptitiously plant it, and then
be miles away when it explodes. Bombings are usually only one or two or
three person jobs and therefore do not require the same organizational
expertise, logistics, and knowledge required of more complicated or
sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, barricade and hostage
situations, assassination, and assaults against defended targets.
Attacks on installations (including attacks with automatic weapons
as well as hand grenades, bazookas, and rocket- propelled grenades,
drive-by shootings, arson, vandalism, and sabotage other than bombing)
are a distant second to bombing, accounting for 22 percent of all
terrorist operations since 1968.8 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the
frequency of various types of terrorist attacks tends to decrease in
direct proportion to the complexity or sophistication required.
Accordingly, hijackings are the third most common tactic, accounting for
only 12 percent;9 followed by assassination (6 percent);10 and,
kidnapping (1 percent).11
The fact that these percentages have remained largely unchanged
for more than a quarter of a century (with one exception12) also
provides compelling evidence that the vast majority of terrorist
organizations are not tactically innovative. Radical in their politics,
these groups are equally conservative in their operations, rarely
deviating from the familiar and adhering to an established modus
operandi that, to their minds at least, minimizes failure and maximizes
success. What innovation does occur is mostly in the methods used to
conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics or in their
use of nonconventional weapons (i.e., chemical, biological, or nuclear).

Terrorists, therefore, seem to prefer the assurance of modest
success to more complicated and complex--but potentially higher pay-off
(in terms of casualties and publicity)--operations. Indeed, this
explanation possibly accounts for the overall paucity of terrorist
"spectaculars" and the mostly limited number of casualties historically
inflicted in terrorist attacks (i.e., more often in the tens and
twenties, if at all, than in the low hundreds). Indeed, since the
beginning of the century fewer than a dozen terrorist incidents have
occurred that have resulted in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at
one time.13 The recent spate of suicide bombings in Israel by
Palestinians opposed to negotiations to resolve that long-standing
conflict underscores this point. Even when a terrorist deliberately
sacrifices himself in the course of the attack, seldom does the death
toll reach double figures: only seven persons, for example, tragically
lost their lives in the incident on April 6; five perished in the
following week's attack. The massive car bomb that exploded on Sunday,
April 24, 1994, in Johannesburg, South Africa, is another case in point:
despite the bombers' obvious intention to inflict mass indiscriminate
casualties, only nine persons were killed.
These proclivities, therefore, directly affect, if not limit, the
weapons technology that terrorists can and will use. Accordingly, based
on the historical record, future terrorist employment of either
high-tech weapons systems or weapons of mass destruction (i.e.,
chemical, biological or nuclear) would appear unlikely. However, both
the longevity of this trend and the self-imposed stasis of terrorist
technology could change dramatically as a result of three emerging
trends in terrorist activity:
• The resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative
and the implications that it has to trigger future acts of mass,
indiscriminate violence;
• The increasing "amateurization" of terrorism--a reflection, in
part, of the growth of religious terrorism but which also may contribute
to the loosening of previous self-imposed constraints on operations and
lethality; and,
• The increasing sophistication and evident growing tactical and
technological competence of certain veteran terrorist organizations
across the technological spectrum.
The Resurgence of Religious Terrorism.
One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism
during the past 15 years has been the resurgence and proliferation of
terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative.14 In 1968, for
example, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups active throughout
the world could be classified as religious, that is, having aims and
motivations reflecting a salient religious character or influence.15 Not
until 1980, as a result of the repercussions from the revolution in Iran
the previous year,16 do the first "modern"17 religious terrorist groups
appear. Even so, despite the large increase in the total number of
identifiable international terrorist groups and concomitant increase of
ethnic separatist organizations (from 3 to 32), only 2 of the 64 groups
are predominantly religious in character and motivation (al-Dawa and the
Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution). Twelve years later,
however, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased nearly

six-fold while--at a time of increasingly strident assertions of ethnic,
national, and cultural uniqueness--the number of ethnic-separatist
terrorist groups has declined and--notwithstanding the end of the cold
war--the number of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (or some idiosyncratic
interpretation of those dicta) has remained unchanged.
The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative
for higher levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of
various Shi'a Islamic groups. Although these organizations committed
only 8 percent of all international terrorist incidents since 1982, they
are nonetheless responsible for 28 percent of the total number of
deaths.18 Moreover, contrary to its depiction and discussion in Western
news accounts, terrorism motivated by religion is by no means a
phenomenon restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the
Middle East. Many of the characteristics of Shi'a terrorist groups, such
as the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense
of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation
with the elimination of a broadly defined category of "enemies," are
also apparent among militant Christian white supremacists in the United
States, in at least some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in
Israel, and among some radical Sikh movements in India.19
The fact that for many of these groups the elimination of whole
segments of society is a major objective of their terrorist campaigns
implies an almost axiomatic attempt to use weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical or biological warfare agents or radioactive
materials. During the past decade, for example, religious terrorists or
members of various "cults" have come closest to crossing the threshold
of terrorist use of bona fide weapons of mass destruction. They have,
for example, either attempted or at least pursued the idea of:
• Poisoning the water supplies of major American urban centers;20
• Dispersing toxic chemicals through internal building ventilation
systems;21
• Blowing up a religious
cataclysmic "holy war";22
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• Staging indiscriminate, wanton simultaneous bombings of crowded,
busy urban centers;23 and,
• Contaminating food in public restaurants.24
That
terrorists
motivated
by
a
religious
imperative
can
contemplate such massive acts of death and destruction is a reflection
of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty.
Terrorism
thus
assumes
a
transcendental
dimension,25
and
its
perpetrators are seemingly unconstrained by the political, moral, or
practical constraints that affect other terrorists. Whereas secular
terrorists generally consider indiscriminate violence immoral and
counterproductive,26 religious terrorists regard such violence as both
morally justified and a necessary expedient for the attainment of their
goals. Religious and secular terrorists also have different perceptions
of themselves and their violent acts. Secular terrorists regard violence
as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is
basically good or to foment the creation of a new system. Religious
terrorists, on the other hand, regard themselves not as components of a

system, but as "outsiders" seeking vast changes in the existing order.27
This sense of alienation enables the religious terrorist to contemplate
far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than
secular terrorists and indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category
of "enemies" for attack: basically anyone who is not a member of their
particular sect or religious movement.
Given this constellation of characteristics and convergence of
motives and capabilities, religious terrorists therefore appear as the
most likely terrorist entity to eventually succeed in affecting some
dramatic act of violence using a weapon of mass destruction.
The "Amateurization" of Terrorism.
A series of terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States
during 1993 suggest that we may have to revise our notions of the
stereotypical terrorist organization.28
In the past, terrorist groups were recognizable as a group of
individuals belonging to an organization with a well-defined command and
control
apparatus,
who
had
been
previously
trained
(however
rudimentarily) in the techniques and tactics of terrorism, were engaged
in conspiracy as a full-time avocation, living underground and
constantly planning or plotting terrorist attacks at times under the
direct control, or operating at the express behest, of a foreign
government. The amateurish World Trade Center bombers, however, may be
the model of a new kind of terrorist group: a more or less ad hoc
amalgamation of like-minded individuals sharing a common religion, the
same friends and frustrations, perhaps having family ties as well, who
simply gravitate toward one another for specific, perhaps even one-time,
operations.29 Rather than being tightly controlled from abroad, these
new part-time terrorists and independent free-lance groups are more
likely to be only indirectly connected to a central command authority or
a foreign government.
Moreover, since this more amorphous and perhaps even transitory
type of group will lack the "footprints" or modus operandi of an actual,
existing terrorist organization, it is likely to prove more difficult
for law enforcement to get a firm idea or build a complete picture of
the dimensions of their intentions and capabilities.30 Indeed, as one
New York City police officer only too presciently observed two months
before the Trade Center attack: it wasn't the established terrorist
groups--with known or suspected members and patterns--that worried him,
but the hitherto unknown "splinter groups," composed of new or marginal
members from an older group, that suddenly surface out of nowhere to
attack.31
Essentially part-time time terrorists, such loose groups of
individuals may be--as the World Trade Center bombers themselves appear
to have been--indirectly influenced or remotely controlled by some
foreign government or nongovernmental entity. The suspicious transfer of
funds from banks in Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained by
the accused bombers in New Jersey just before the Trade Center blast may
illustrate this more indirect or circuitous foreign connection.32
Moreover, the fact that two Iraqi nationals--Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and
Abdul Rahman Yasin-- implicated in the Trade Center conspiracy, fled the
United States (presumably to Iraq),33 in one instance just before the
bombing and in the other shortly after the first arrests, increases

suspicion that the incident may not only have been orchestrated from
abroad but may in fact have been an act of state-sponsored terrorism.34
Thus, in contrast to its depiction in the press as an incident of
terrorism perpetrated by a group of "amateurs" acting either entirely on
their own or, as one of the bomber's defense attorneys portrayed his
client as being manipulated by a "devious, evil . . . genius35 (Yousef),
the genesis of the Trade Center attack may be far more complex.
This use of amateur terrorists as "dupes" or "cut-outs" to mask
the involvement of some foreign patron or government could therefore
greatly benefit terrorist state sponsors who could more effectively
conceal their involvement and thus avoid potential military retaliation
by the victim country and diplomatic or economic sanctions from the
international community. Moreover, the prospective state sponsor's
connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of the
"amateur" terrorists equipment, resources and even some funding could be
self-generating. The explosive device used in the World Trade Center
bomb--constructed out of ordinary, commercially-available materials,
including lawn fertilizer (urea nitrate) and diesel fuel and costing
less than $400 to construct--illustrates this potential.36 Indeed,
despite the Trade Center bombers' almost comical ineptitude in avoiding
capture, they were still able to shake an entire city's--if not
country's-- complacency. Moreover, the single bomb used by these
"amateurs" proved just as deadly and destructive as the more "high-tech"
bombs constructed out of military ordnance, with timing devices powered
by computer micro chips and detonated by sophisticated timing mechanisms
used by their "professional" counterparts. It killed six persons,
injured more than a 1,000 others, gouged out a 180-ft wide crater six
stories deep, and caused an estimated $550 million in both damages to
the twin towers and in lost revenue to the businesses housed there.37
In this respect, this new breed of terrorists may represent even
more of a threat than their predecessors.38 While less control from some
central command authority may indeed be exerted, this may also result in
fewer constraints on the terrorists' operations and targets and fewer
inhibitions on their desire to inflict indiscriminate casualties.39 It
is suspected that the bombers' intent in attacking the World Trade
Center was to bring down one of the twin towers.40 Significant also is
that rather than having been deterred or otherwise affected by the
rapidity with which the FBI and other authorities "cracked" the Trade
Center case, the 15 individuals implicated in the follow-on plot,
uncovered in June 1993, to obtain the release of the Trade Center
bombers, had plotted even more egregious acts of violence. These
included the simultaneous bombing of the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and
George Washington Bridge used daily by thousands of commuters between
New Jersey and Manhattan; a car-bomb attack in the United Nations
building underground garage; a forced entry machine-gun and hand grenade
assault on the Federal Building in lower Manhattan housing the FBI New
York headquarters; and the assassinations of U.N. Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, New York
Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and Brooklyn assemblyman Dov Hilkind.41
The
characteristics
and
attendant
applications
of
this
"amateurization" of terrorism was further demonstrated by the rash of
independent, unconnected acts of "teenage" terrorism that occurred in
California and Washington State last summer. The first incident involved
the 20-year-old leader of a self-styled terrorist group calling itself
the "Fourth Reich Skinheads" and his 17-year-old co-conspirator, who

were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with planning a series of
bombings against a variety of Jewish targets that would culminate in a
machine-gun and hand grenade assault against a South Central Los Angeles
church as its worshippers emerged from Sunday services.42 The operation
had to be postponed, however, after one of the conspirators was refused
permission by his parents to borrow the family car for the attack.43
That same month, in an unrelated incident, a 19-year-old was
arrested and charged with bombing a Tacoma, Washington, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) meeting hall
as the opening salvo in a terrorist campaign directed against rap stars,
synagogues
and
military
installations
throughout
the
Pacific
Northwest.44 Finally, in November, the putative leader of another
teen-age white supremacist group, the "Aryan Liberation Front," was
arrested in Northern California and charged with five fire bombings of a
synagogue, local office of the NAACP, the home of an Asian-American
local politician, and the state office that handles discrimination
claims in Sacramento.45 The youth-- who turned 18 the day after his
arrest--had called a television station after one attack to announce
that, "The A.L.F. takes full responsibility for the attack and promises
to contribute to armed struggles whether it be by rocks, Molotov
cocktails, bombs, guns, to effect the change in Jew capitalism and
America politically."46
In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having the will
and motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so, the
requisite training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge.
Today, however, it is clear that the means and methods of terrorism are
readily available and accessible to anyone with a grievance, agenda or
purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above. Whether abetted
tacitly or actively by a foreign patron or facilitated by commercially
obtainable published bomb-making manuals and operational guidebooks, the
"amateur" terrorist can be just as--and perhaps even more--deadly and
destructive than his more "professional" counterpart. Given the inherent
difficulty in tracking and anticipating this category of adversary--as
opposed to the often more established modus operandi and patterns of
existing terrorist groups--this new breed of terrorist may pose a
greater threat in the future.47
Improved "Professionalism" of Terrorists.
Paradoxically, while on the one hand terrorism frequently attracts
"amateurs," on the other, the sophistication and operational competence
of "professional" terrorists is also increasing. The professionals are
becoming demonstrably more adept in their trade craft of death and
destruction; more formidable in terms of their abilities of tactical
modification, adjustment and innovation; and able to operate for
sustained periods of time while avoiding detection, interception and
arrest or capture. More disquieting, these "professional" terrorists
seem to be considerably more ruthless as well.
An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection appears to
distinquish subsequent generations of existing terrorist groups, whereby
every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors, becoming
smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate.48 For
terrorists, intelligence is not only an essential prerequisite for a
successful operation, but a sine qua non for survival. Successor
generations, therefore, routinely study the "lessons" from mistakes made

by former comrades who have been either killed or apprehended. Press
accounts,
judicial
indictments,
courtroom
testimony,
and
trial
transcripts are meticulously culled for information on security force
tactics and methods and are absorbed by surviving group members.
According to one German government official, terrorists belonging
to the Red Army Faction (RAF), for example, "closely study every court
case against them to discover their weak spots." Whereas, in the past,
German police could usually obtain fingerprints from the bottom of
toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators, RAF terrorists today apply
a special ointment to their fingers that, after drying, prevents
fingerprints and thus thwarts identification and incrimination.49 As a
spokesperson for the Bundeskriminalamt lamented, "The `Third Generation'
learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessors and about how the
police works . . . they now know how to operate very carefully."50
Indeed, according to a former member of the organization, Peter Juergen
Brock, currently serving the seventh year of a life sentence for murder,
the group "has reached maximum efficiency."51
Similar accolades have also been bestowed on the latest generation
of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) fighters. The former General
Officer Commanding British Forces in Northern Ireland, General Sir John
Wilsey, has described the PIRA as "an absolutely formidable enemy. The
essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some
of their operations are brilliant in terrorist terms."52 Even the PIRA's
comparatively unsophisticated Loyalist terrorist counterparts are on
such a "learning curve as well." As one Royal Ulster Constabulary police
officer has noted, the Protestant groups "[m]ore and more . . . are
running their operations from small cells, on a need to know basis. They
have cracked down on loose talk. They have learned how to destroy
forensic evidence. And if you bring them in for questioning, they say
nothing."53
Not only are successor generations often smarter than their
predecessors, but they also tend to be both more sophisticated and
ruthless as well as less idealistic. For some, in fact, violence becomes
almost an end in itself--cathartic release, a self-satisfying blow
struck against the hated "system"--rather than being regarded as the
deliberate means to a specific political end embraced by previous
generations.54 A dedicated "hard core" of some 20 to 30 terrorists
today, for example, compose a third generation of Germany's RAF. In
contrast to the group's first generation, who more than 20 years ago
embarked on an anti-establishment campaign of nonlethal bombings and
arson attacks, the present generation has pursued a strategy of
cold-blooded assassination.55
During the past 7 years the RAF has murdered six prominent,
heavily guarded, Germans. Indeed, the group's almost relentless
targeting of well-protected individuals sets it apart from the vast
majority of terrorist organizations who typically aim for the "softer"
(i.e., easily accessed) rather than "harder" target.56 The RAF's last
victim was Detlev Rohwedder, a wealthy industrialist and chairman of the
Treuhandanstalt, or Public Trustee, the government agency charged with
overseeing the economic transition of eastern Germany. Rohwedder was
killed in April 1991 while he sat in his study with a shot fired from a
high-powered rifle.57 In December 1989, financier and Deutsche Bank
president Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated when a state-of-the-art
remote control bomb concealed in a parked bicycle and triggered by a

light beam was detonated just as Herrhausen's car passed.58 A similar
device was used the following July in an attempt to assassinate
Germany's top government counterterrorist official, Hans Neusel.59
Almost as disturbing as the assassinations themselves is the fact that,
until this past summer, the perpetrators--and their fellow conspirators-had eluded what is perhaps the most sophisticated antiterrorist
machinery in the world.60
The PIRA's relentless quest to pierce the armor protecting both
the security forces in Northern Ireland and the most senior government
officials in England illustrates the professional evolution and
increasing operational sophistication of a terrorist group. The first
generation of early 1970s' PIRA devices were often little more than
crude antipersonnel bombs, consisting of a handful of roofing nails,
wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive and detonated simply by
lighting a fuse. Time-bombs from the same era were hardly more
sophisticated. They typically were constructed from a few sticks of
dynamite and commercial detonators stolen from construction sites or
rock quarries and attached to ordinary battery powered alarm clocks.
Neither device was very reliable and often put the bomber at
considerable risk. The process of placing and actually lighting the
first type of device carried with it the inherent potential to attract
undesired attention while affording the bomber little time to effect the
attack and make good his or her escape. Although the second type of
device was designed to mitigate precisely this danger, its timing and
detonation mechanism was often so crude that accidental or premature
explosions
were
not
infrequent,
thus
causing
some
terrorists
inadvertently to kill themselves.61
In hopes of obviating, or at least reducing, these risks, the
PIRA's bombmakers invented a means of detonating bombs from a safe
distance using the radio controls for model aircraft purchased at hobby
shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of
Defence's (MoD) scientific research and development (R&D) division in
turn developed a system of electronic countermeasures and jamming
techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of
attack.62 However, rather than abandon this tactic completely, the PIRA
began to search for a solution. In contrast to the state-of-the-art
laboratories, huge budgets, and academic credentials of their government
counterparts, PIRA's own R&D department toiled in cellars beneath
cross-border safe houses and backrooms of urban tenements for 5 years
before devising a network of sophisticated electronic switches for their
bombs
that
would
ignore
or
bypass
the
Army's
electronic
countermeasures.63
Once again, the MoD scientists returned to their laboratories.
They emerged with a new system of electronic scanners able to detect
radio emissions the moment the radio is switched on, just tens of
seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal.
The almost infinitesimal window of time provided by this "early warning"
of impending attack is just sufficient to allow Army technicians to
activate a series of additional electronic measures to neutralize the
transmission signal and render detonation impossible.
For a time, this countermeasure proved effective as well. But
within the past 2 years the PIRA has discovered a means to outwit even
this countermeasure. Utilizing radar detectors, such as those employed
by motorists in the United States, in 1991 the group's bombmakers

fabricated a detonating system that can be triggered by the same type of
hand-held radar gun used by police throughout the world to catch
speeding motorists. Since the radar gun can be aimed at its target
before being switched on, and the signal that it transmits is nearly
instantaneous, no practical means currently exists that allows the time
needed either to detect or intercept the transmission signal.64 More
recently, PIRA R&D units have developed yet another means to detonate
bombs using a photo flash "slave" unit that can be triggered from a
distance of up to 800 meters by a flash of light. The device, which
sells for between 60 and 70 English pounds, is used by commercial
photographers to produce simultaneous flashes during photo shoots. The
PIRA bombers attach the unit to the detonating system on a bomb and then
simply activate it with a commercially-available, ordinary flashgun.65
As with the new "photo flash" means of detonation, the
sophistication of a device is often its very simplicity. In recent
years, for example, the PIRA has mounted a highly effective campaign of
"economic warfare" using simple incendiary devices left in Belfast and
London department stores. These use a plastic cassette tape container, a
miniature detonator, a timing device powered by a radio battery, a small
amount of plastic explosive or explosive power, two or three capsules of
lighter fuel and some paper to ensure combustion. The devices are small,
highly portable, easily constructed and planted. They are nearly
risk-free to the bomber as the timer can usually be set for up to 12
hours. The cost is less than 5 pounds to produce.66 Thus far these bombs
have caused more than $15 million in property damage.67 The process of
planting the devices is typically a one person job, but allows that
person potentially to operate without detection over a wide area and
thus create an impression "of a concerted attack involving a large
team."68
On a larger scale, bombs constructed out of ordinary,
commercially-available fertilizer (such as was used in the World Trade
Center bombing) have devastated commercial districts both in Northern
Ireland and in England. In April 1992, in what was described "as the
most powerful explosion in London since World War II," a bomb
constructed with up to a ton of fertilizer exploded outside the Baltic
Exchange building in the heart of the city's financial center, killing
three persons, wounding 90 others, and leaving a 12-foot wide crater. It
caused $1.25 billion in damage.69 Exactly a year later, a similar bomb
devastated the nearby Bishops Gate district, killing one person and
injuring 40 others. Initial estimates put the damage at $1.5 billion.70
Long a staple of PIRA operations, fertilizer costs on average 1 percent
of
a
comparable
amount
of
plastic
explosive.
However,
after
adulteration, fertilizer is far less powerful than plastic explosive.
Semtex explodes at about 8,000 yards a second and has a high explosive
rating of 1.3; improvised explosives explode at only about 3,000 yards a
second and range between 0.25 and 0.8 in rating. It also tends to cause
more damage than plastic explosives because the energy of the blast is
sustained and less controlled.71 Not surprisingly, therefore, the PIRA
bombers have earned a reputation for their innovative expertise,
adaptability, and cunning. "There are some very bright people around,"
the British Army's Chief Ammunitions Technical Officer (CATO) in
Northern Ireland recently remarked. "I would rate them very highly for
improvisation. PIRA bombs are very well made."72 A similar accolade is
offered by the staff officer of the British Army's 321 Explosives and
Ordinance Disposal Company: "We are dealing with the first division," he
said. "I don't think there is any organisation in the world as cunning

as the IRA. They have had 20 years at it and they have learned from
their experience. We have a great deal of respect for their skills . . .
not as individuals, but their skills."73 While not yet nearly as good as
the PIRA, the province's Loyalist terrorist groups are themselves
reportedly on a "learning curve": becoming increasing adept in the
construction, concealment and surreptitious placement of bombs.74
Even attacks that are not successful in conventionally- understood
military terms of casualties inflicted or assets destroyed can still be
a success for the terrorists provided that they are technologically
daring enough to garner media and public attention. Indeed, the
terrorist group's fundamental organizational imperative is to act even
if their action is not completely successful, but still brings them
publicity. This imperative also drives the persistent search for new
ways to overcome, circumvent or defeat governmental security and
countermeasures. Thus, while the PIRA failed to kill then Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party's 1984 conference in
Brighton, the technological ingenuity involving the bomb's placement at
the conference site weeks before the event and its detonation timing
device powered by a computer microchip nonetheless succeeded in
capturing the world's headlines and providing the PIRA with a platform
from which to warn Mrs. Thatcher and all other British leaders: "Today
we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once--you will
have to be lucky always."75 Similarly, although the remote control
mortar attack staged by the PIRA on No. 10 Downing Street--as Prime
Minister John Major and his Cabinet met at the height of the 1991 Gulf
War--failed to hit its intended target, the attack nonetheless
successfully elbowed the war out of the limelight and shone renewed
media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their impressive
ability to strike at the nerve center of the British government even at
a time of heightened security.76 The PIRA's impressive ability to
capture headlines with daring, clever operations was most recently
demonstrated by the series of remote control mortar attacks on London's
Heathrow Airport in March. Three attacks in five days nearly paralyzed
all air traffic77 and provided the terrorists with an ideal propaganda
vehicle demonstrating terrorism's ineluctable paradox: that terrorists
can attack anywhere at anytime while the government's security forces
are powerless and unable to protect every conceivable target all the
time.78
Conclusion.
What do these trends suggest for the future? First, terrorists
will continue to rely on the same two basic weapons that they have used
successfully for more than a century: the gun and the bomb. What changes
we will see will be more in the realm of clever adaptations or
modifications to existing "off the shelf" technology (such as the PIRA
is
so
accomplished
at)
or
the
continued
utilization
of
readily-available, commercially- purchased materials that can be
fabricated into crude--but lethally effective and damaging--weapons
(such as the explosive device used by the World Trade Center bombers).
Their preference for this traditional arsenal is a reflection of an
operational conservatism imposed by the terrorist organizational
imperative to succeed. For this reason, terrorists must always keep
ahead of the technology curve. Thus, when confronted by new security
measures, terrorists will seek to find and exploit new vulnerabilities
or else simply change their tactics accordingly.

Second, the sophistication of these devices will be in their
simplicity. Unlike military ordnance, such as plastic explosive, for
example, the materials used in "home-made" bombs are both readily- and
commercially-available, thus they are perfectly legal to possess until
actually concocted or assembled into a bomb. These materials are also
far more difficult to trace or for experts to obtain a "signature." For
example, the type of explosive used in the 1988 in-flight bombing of Pan
Am 103 was Semtex H, a plastic explosive manufactured in Czechoslavakia
and sold primarily to other former-Warsaw Pact countries during the cold
war as well as to such well-known state sponsors of terrorism as Libya,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. Thus, for foreign governments
seeking to commission terrorist attacks or use terrorists as surrogate
warriors, the terrorists' use of such "home-made" materials carries with
it both advantage and appeal in possibly enabling the state sponsor to
avoid military retaliation or international sanction.
Third, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a
religious imperative, the proliferation of "amateur" terrorist groups,
and the growing sophistication of established, more "professional"
groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction
than in the past. The erosion of the self-imposed constraints that have
hitherto inhibited the infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties by
terrorists is evident in each of these categories. Indeed, terrorism
today increasingly reflects a deadly mixture of all three: it is
perpetrated by "amateurs"; motivated by religious enmity, blind hatred
or a mix of individually idiosyncratic motivations; and conceiveably
exploited or manipulated by terrorist "professionals" and their state
sponsors. In this respect, the availability of relatively sophisticated,
off-the-shelf
weaponry
such
as
hand-held,
precision-guided
surface-to-air missiles, or the relative ease with which chemical or
biological warfare agents can be manufactured, suggests that terrorists
possessing this constellation of characteristics would have little
trouble crossing into the domain of either "high tech" weaponry or
weapons of mass destruction.79
Moreover, the post-cold war new world order and attendant
possibilities and payoffs of independence, sovereignty, and power may
entice both new and would-be nations along with the perpetually
disenfranchised to embrace terrorism as a solution to, or vehicle for
the realization of their dreams. Today, when old empires and countries
are crumbling and new ones are being built, the possession of a nuclear
bomb or the development of a chemical or biological warfare capability
may thus become increasingly attractive either to new nations seeking to
preserve their sovereignty or to would-be nations seeking to attain
their independence. In both instances, terrorists may find new roles for
their skills and expertise. Terrorists may be employed by countries
either to steal nuclear weapons or strategic material from another
country, or they may be paid to stage a covert nuclear, chemical, or
biological attack to conceal the involvement or complicity of their
state patron. In this respect, the lessons of Iraq's overt invasion of
Kuwait loom large. In the future, terrorists may become the "ultimate
fifth column": a clandestine, cost-effective force used to wage war
covertly against more powerful rivals or to subvert neighboring
countries or hostile regimes.
By the same token, ethnic/religious fanaticism--as previously
noted--could more easily allow terrorists to overcome the psychological
barriers to mass murder than could a radical political agenda. A

terrorist group of religious zealots, with state support, in a context
of ongoing violence (i.e., the civil wars occurring in the former
Yugoslavia or some new internecine conflict in one of the former Soviet
Union's republics) could see the acquisition and use of a chemical,
biological, or nuclear capability as a viable option. State sponsorship,
in
particular,
could
provide
terrorists
with
the
incentives,
capabilities, and resources they previously lacked for undertaking an
ambitious operation in any of these domains. Combined with intense
ethnic enmity or a strong religious imperative, this could prove
deadly.80
One final observation seems in order: while the volume of
worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, one enduring feature
is that Americans remain favored targets of terrorists abroad. Since
1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose
nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorists.81
This is a phenomenon attributable as much to the geographical scope and
diversity of America's overseas commercial interests and the large
number of its military bases on foreign soil as to U.S. stature as a
superpower and leader of the free world. Terrorists, therefore, are
attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of
the plethora of readily available targets. Many terrorists believe that
it is easier to operate against Americans overseas than it is to strike
at targets in the United States. Furthermore, there is the symbolic
value inherent in any blow struck against U.S. "imperialism,"
"expansionism," or "economic exploitation." Almost obligingly, the
American press can be counted upon to provide publicity and exposure for
any attack on an American target, especially if there are civilian
casualties.
These reasons suggest that, despite the end of both the
cold war and the ideological polarization that divided the world, the
United States will nonetheless remain an attractive target for
terrorists seeking to call attention to themselves and their causes.
Moreover, as the only superpower, the United States may likely be blamed
for more of the world's ills, and therefore could be the focus of more
terrorist attacks than before.82
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